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Abstract 
In 1783 the British and Irish governments launched an experiment by funding the 
establishment of a settlement that was expected to become a new city. It was called 
‘New Geneva’ and situated on the site of a village called Passage, just outside the port 
of Waterford in Ireland. New Geneva was to be peopled by rebels, Genevans who had 
fled or were ready to flee in the aftermath of the failed revolution of 1782. This article 
explains that for the main Genevan actors in the Waterford experiment, François 
d’Ivernois (Sir Francis d’Ivernois from 1796) and his friend Jacques-Antoine Du 
Roveray, the exodus from Geneva was part of a greater battle to save Europe’s small 
states, and especially the republics of Europe. The article further reveals that the 
major supporters of New Geneva were seeking to address Britain’s problems both 
domestically and as an empire. Charles Stanhope, then Lord Mahon (from 1786 3rd 
earl of Stanhope), and William Petty, then 2nd earl of Shelburne (from 1784 1st 
marquess of Lansdowne), each hoped that the Genevans would introduce cultures 
capable of palliating the excessive corruption or ‘mercantile system’ they saw in 
Britain’s commercial society. The history of New Geneva underscored the perilous 
state of Europe’s republics before 1789, the widespread extent of the view that Britain 
and Ireland were in crisis, and that extreme and cosmopolitan reform projects were in 





In 1783 the British and Irish governments launched an experiment by funding the 
establishment of a settlement that was expected to become a new city. It was called 
‘New Geneva’ and situated on the site of a village called Passage, near the confluence 
of the ‘Three Sisters’ rivers, the Barrow, Nore and Suir, just outside the ancient city 
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and significant St George’s Channel port of Waterford in Ireland, on the west bank 
opposite the promontory of Duncannon Fort. New Geneva was to be peopled by 
rebels, Genevans who had fled or were ready to flee in the aftermath of the failed 
revolution of 1782; the revolution often identified as the European starting point of 
‘the age of revolutions’.1 The rebels, in the name of liberty, democracy and the 
defence of Calvinism, had taken control of Geneva in an attempt to transform an 
aristocratic republic that was also a confessional state.2 After the invasion of foreign 
armies, the rebels became ‘fugitives in the mountains’ and ‘victims of the most 
profound and odious machinations that a people has ever been subjected to’, and were 
seeking ‘a new country’ that would ‘save old Geneva’. They were interested in 
finding asylum ‘in a great monarchy, in an empire where the rights of man are 
respected’. They believed that their success would punish tyrants and the states whose 
politics were motivated only by ambition; for the Genevans this meant those states in 
the immediate vicinity, France, Savoy and the Swiss cantons.3 The experiment was 
accompanied by high expectations. As a ‘great national occurrence’, it was written in 
the London press that ‘the emigration of the Genevans has called forth those splendid 
virtues, the amiableness of which is sufficient, in some measure, to redeem the fallen 
dignity of human nature’.4 Historians, and especially historians writing today, have 
neglected the story and its implications for our understanding of the turbulent period 
before 1789.5 
                                                        
1 R. R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 
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Patriotism and the Empires of the East (Princeton, New Jersey, 1991), pp. 459-604; Manuela 
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Suppl. 32, fols 303, 372, 374. 
4 Whitehall Evening Post (London), 29 April – 1 May 1783; Issue 5554. 
5 The most accurate account of New Geneva remains Otto Karmin’s Sir Francis d’Ivernois 1757-1842: 
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Historical and Archealogical Society, 75 (1970), pp. 29-35; Daniel Dowling, ‘New Geneva’, Decies, 
29 (1985), pp. 32-39. 
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As the eighteenth century progressed it was increasingly accepted that existing 
republics were everywhere were in decline. Republicanism in Europe, praised by 
Montesquieu and by Rousseau but recognised by both authors to be in a delicate state 
and with an uncertain future, was in its death-throes by the 1780s. Republics were too 
small for military defence and economic independence. Large states were increasingly 
dominant across Europe. The sources of national strength seemed to lie in the size of 
markets and the capacity to generate substantial funds in international money markets, 
which gave large states and aspiring empires far greater power than the small states 
and republics that had traditionally been able to stand against them. Larger empires 
threatened the small republics in the traditional sense of military invasion, but also 
through economic imperialism, by which the markets the republics relied upon could 
easily be suffocated by external powers with greater trading might. The small 
republics were sometimes deemed the backbone of European liberty, economic 
wellbeing, morals and religion but their existence did not appear to be compatible 
with the facts of modern economic and political life. Republics could no longer rely 
upon manliness or courage, diplomatic action, alliance-building or economic 
specialisation to maintain themselves, such was the gulf in power between them and 
the larger states. The other longstanding survival strategy, the creation of 
confederations, despite its success in North America, had not prevented the relative 
decline of the Dutch and the Swiss. The nature of Europe was seen to have changed, 
and to be becoming a continent dominated by France, and with far fewer small states 
and no republics. As Adam Ferguson put it in An essay on the history of civil society, 
republics in the modern world were like shrubs ‘under the shade of a taller wood, 
choked by the neighbourhood of more powerful states’.  They were ‘like the trader in 
Poland, who is the more despicable, and the less secure, that he is neither master nor 
slave’.6 
 
This article explains that for the main Genevan actors in the Waterford 
experiment, and especially the little-known but influential François d’Ivernois (Sir 
Francis d’Ivernois from 1796) and his friend Jacques-Antoine Du Roveray, the 
                                                        
6 Adam Ferguson, An essay on the history of civil society (Edinburgh, 1767), p. 91. See further Richard 
Whatmore, ‘“Neither masters nor slaves”: Small States and Empire in the Long Eighteenth Century’, in 
D. Kelly (ed.), Lineages of Empire: The Historical Roots of British Imperial Thought (Oxford, 2009), 
pp. 53-81. 
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exodus from Geneva was part of a greater battle to save Europe’s small states, and 
especially the republics of Europe. Republics like Geneva were threatened by 
imperial powers, by a perceived moral bankruptcy and by economic collapse. 
Explaining why abandoning a republic and moving to a colony within an imperial 
monarchy would result in saving republics in the modern world was the task the 
Genevans set themselves. If they failed to provide a rationale for the experiment - that 
moving away from Geneva was in reality maintaining republican virtues – Genevans 
would not be persuaded to migrate to the new city. Traditionally the Genevan radicals 
had not trusted the British to defend the interests of the republics. Everything changed 
in 1782, including the Genevans’ perception of Britain as an empire that offered a 
future for republicans, in a self-governing community. The story of the turn of 
European republicans towards Britain was a complicated one, and in part due to the 
perceived success of Scotland after the union, with its own religious settlement and 
laws. The turn became still more marked as the French revolutionary armies invaded 
the old republics of Europe in the 1790s.7 
 
The New Geneva experiment took place in auspicious times for Britain. 
British forces had surrendered at Yorktown in October 1781 and by March of the 
following year negotiations had begun to end the war with North America, France, 
Spain and the Dutch Republic. In the view of numerous commentators, Britain had 
finally lost the second hundred years’ war against France. Britain was the edge of 
bankruptcy, the economic balance of power in Europe was shifting, and many 
perceived that Britain had to look to domestic retrenchment and economical reform in 
order to survive.8 Restoring trading links with North America was seen to be vital.9 
For radicals, events in America presaged the collapse of the British constitution 
because of the corruption that had caused both the diminution of the empire and the 
continued loss of civil and political liberties at home.10 Projects to maintain Britain as 
                                                        
7 Richard Whatmore, Against War and Empire: Geneva, Britain and France in the Eighteenth Century 
(New Haven, CT, 2012); Janet Polasky, Revolutions Without Borders: The Call to Liberty in the 
Atlantic World (New Haven, CT, 2015). 
8 Edmund Burke, ‘Speech on Economical Reform’, 11 February 1780 in A. Woods, and William B. 
Todd (eds), The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, vol. 3: Party, Parliament, and the American 
War: 1774-1780 (Oxford, 1996). 
9 Richard Champion, Considerations on the present situation of Great Britain and the United States of 
North America (London, 2nd edn, 1784), pp. 210-217. 
10 Anon., The source of the evil, or, The system displayed: addressed to the gentry, yeomanry, 
freeholders, and electors of England by a freeholder (London, 1784), pp. 3-18. 
 5 
a free state abounded. For numerous observers, parliamentary reform was the key, 
being ‘the chief pursuit of all our political doctors’.11  
 
For others, the corruption that infected British politics was derived from 
economic sources. Adam Smith’s description of the ‘mercantile system’ in the fourth 
book of his Wealth of Nations (1776) was central to such perspectives. Smith 
identified a reduction in wealth caused by the bounties, drawbacks and duties 
intended to maintain the trade of a particular nation at the expense of the trade of its 
rivals. Smith also described the corruption that accompanied the system, in the form 
of the excessive wealth, and sometimes the excessive political influence, of its 
beneficiaries. As he put it, ‘It is the industry which is carried on for the benefit of the 
rich and the powerful that is principally encouraged by our mercantile system. That 
which is carried on for the benefit of the poor and the indigent is too often either 
neglected or oppressed.’12 In the third book of the Wealth of Nations Smith compared 
the natural path of economic development destroyed in Europe by feudalism, and the 
modern mercantile system, whose ‘unnatural and retrograde order’ prevented the full 
development of commerce at the same time as it caused war.13 The mercantile system 
owed it origins to the fact that the urbanization of Europe, which was a legacy of the 
Roman Empire, had proceeded apace across the continent without any concomitant 
commercialization of agriculture. Monopoly, ‘of one kind or another’, was ‘the sole 
engine of the mercantile system’.14 The promotion of natural liberty against the 
controls of the mercantile system was the solution, although Smith believed those 
who advocated the immediate abandonment of controls to be utopian projectors.15 
James Anderson drew the lesson that the loss of America was to be welcomed, 
because large empires were unsuited to commerce and civil liberty, and corrupt forms 
                                                        
11 Soame Jenyns, Thoughts on a Parliamentary Reform (London, 2nd edn, 1784), p. 2. 
12 Adam Smith (R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, eds), An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, 2 vols (Indianapolis, 1981), II, bk. IV, ch. 8, p. 4. 
13 Smith, Wealth of Nations, II, bk. III, ch. 1, p. 9. See further Istvan Hont, ‘Adam Smith and the 
Political Economy of the “Unnatural and Retrograde” Order’, in his Jealousy of Trade: International 
Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA, 2005), pp. 354-388; 
‘Adam Smith’s History of Law and Government as Political Theory’, in Richard Burke and Raymond 
Geuss (eds), Political Judgement. Essays for John Dunn (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 131-171. 
14 Smith, Wealth of Nations, II, bk. IV, ch. 7, p. 175. 
15 Donald Winch, Riches and Poverty. An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1750-
1834 (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 90-123. 
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of commerce derived from distant colonies.16 John Holroyd, Lord Sheffield, 
responded in the most phlegmatic terms, stating that Britain was in far better health 
than was recognized and that the traditional trade policy based on the navigation acts 
needed to be continued.17  
 
The article reveals the extent to which New Geneva, for its major supporters 
in Britain, was conceived to address the problems Britain faced, both domestically 
and as an empire. The two men who were most involved with New Geneva in Britain, 
Charles Stanhope, then Lord Mahon (from 1786 3rd earl of Stanhope), and William 
Petty, then 2nd earl of Shelburne (from 1784 1st marquess of Lansdowne), each shared 
Smith’s diagnosis of the economic ills of modern Europe and especially the unnatural 
linkage between trade and war. Stanhope hoped that the Genevans would introduce 
cultures capable of palliating the excessive corruption he saw in modern commercial 
society that was evident across Britain. For Shelburne, New Geneva was part of a 
broader plan for international reform, encompassing saving the republics, but that was 
more focused upon Britain. Like Stanhope, Shelburne saw a need to counter the 
economic corruption of the ‘mercantile system’, which he believed was destroying the 
morals and liberties that the free British state rested upon. Britain was seen by 
Shelburne to be in the midst of an acute crisis that might very well destroy the state. 
He saw New Geneva as an element of his plan for ensuring the survival of Britain. 
Shelburne was a practical politician and this was reflected in many of the decisions he 
took, some of which antagonized more principled but less influential contemporaries. 
At the same time, however, Shelburne saw New Geneva for a brief period as one of 
several sources of change, potentially capable of transforming the political world 
from a state of corruption to a state of moral and economic health. In short, the 
movement of republicans from Geneva was anticipated as heralding far greater 
change and inaugurating an era of radical reform and reformation. 
 
Other elements of the New Geneva story will only be treated in passing. From 
an Irish perspective, the idea of a Genevan exodus was typical of what had gone 
before, being an extension of the ‘Protestant International’ that had seen Huguenot 
                                                        
16 James Anderson, The Interest of Great Britain With Regard to Her American Colonies, Considered 
(London, 1782), pp. 100-115. 
17 John Holroyd, Lord Sheffield, Observations on the Commerce of the United States (London, 2nd edn, 
1784). 
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and Vaudois refugees establish safe havens in Britain and North America during 
Louis XIV’s wars.18 In tune with the motivation behind former schemes, some of 
those involved considered New Geneva a brilliant means of turning Ireland’s 
backward peasants into industrious artisans. The history of Ireland in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries was replete with attempts to alter the nature of the colony 
through immigration. Making Ireland British through colonization and plantation was 
expected to turn a barbarous and rebellious Catholic society more loyal, industrious 
and peaceable, and as such amounted to a Protestant rejoinder to comparable Spanish 
activities in the New World.19 Foreign Protestants were increasingly welcomed in 
such projects, as migration from Britain tailed off, as Irish Protestants themselves left 
for North America, and as economic conditions in Ireland failed to improve.20 
Significantly, New Geneva was used to bolster arguments against greater political 
liberty in Ireland, on the grounds that such liberties were irrelevant in the pursuit of 
‘the only real strength of nations…men and money’.21  
 
Equally commonplace was the statement that the new city would be 
accompanied by the conversion of Irish Catholics into Protestants. Indeed, the initial 
support of King George III for the project may well have been because it promised the 
promotion of forms of Protestantism, and of the morals associated with them, that he 
admired. The devout Calvinist Jean-André Deluc, who was Reader to Queen 
Charlotte at Windsor and a prominent member of the Georgian court, had been a 
leading defender of Calvinist mores at Geneva and a leader of the rebels in the city 
until he came to England in 1773. Many of the Genevan rebels were his former 
political associates and friends.22 In 1782-3 New Geneva was also cited as a means to 
                                                        
18 John Bosher, ‘Huguenot Merchants and the Protestant International in the Seventeenth Century’, 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 52/1 (1995), pp. 77-102; Robin Gwynn, ‘The Huguenots in 
Britain, the ‘Protestant International’ and the defeat of Louis XIV’ in Randolph Vigne and Charles 
Littleton (eds), From Strangers to Citizens. The Integration of Immigrant Communities in Britain, 
Ireland and Colonial America 1550-1750 (Brighton, 2001), pp. 412-424; William O’Reilly, ‘The 
Naturalisation Act of 1709 and the Settlement of Germans in Britain, Ireland and the Colonies’, in 
Vigne and Littleton (eds), From Strangers to Citizens, pp. 292-302; David E. Lambert, The Protestant 
International and the Huguenot Migration to Virginia (New York, 2010). 
19 Nicholas Canny, Making Ireland British 1580-1650 (Oxford, 2001), pp. 51-2, 132-4, 212-3, 247-50, 
277-8, 289-90. 
20 Nicholas Canny, Kingdom and Colony. Ireland in the Atlantic World 1560-1800 (Baltimore and 
London, 1988), p. 129. 
21 Francis Dobbs, A history of Irish affairs, from the 12th of Oct. 1779, to the 15th Sept., 1782, the day 
of Lord Temple’s arrival (Dublin, 1782), pp. 150-151. 
22 Etienne Clavière to Jean-André Deluc, 21 December 1773, Bibliothèque de Genève, MS Fr 2463, 
fols 92-93; Jean-André Deluc, Lettres physiques et morales, sur les montagnes et sur l'histoire de la 
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promote political liberty, in accordance with the Patriot mood in the Irish Parliament 
following the repeal of Poyning’s Law, which had given Dublin legislative 
independence from London. Some of those involved saw the protection of the 
Genevan exiles to be a cosmopolitan duty developed from the love of mankind, 
arguing that political and economic liberty needed to be fostered in tandem. All of 
these themes were commonplace in Irish and English debate and descended from 
William Petty’s idea of ‘transmuting one people into the other’.23 New Geneva could 
be incorporated into popular desires for the extension of liberty, elite schemes for 
national improvement and governance, and defences of Protestantism.24 The Genevan 
exodus is an illustration of the fact that the 1780s saw a large number of cosmopolitan 
reform projects, founded on the belief that the world was tired of war, that the benefits 
of reform could be rationally accepted by all parties, and that a new era of commercial 
peace and civilization was imminent. The failure of the experiment helped to 
contribute to the extreme positions that were taken in the 1790s, destroying all of the 




Although official links between Britain and Geneva were for the most part fleeting in 
the eighteenth century, because Geneva was deemed to be within a French sphere of 
influence, a large number of British travellers visited the independent republic. One of 
the reasons was the Huguenot diaspora caused by the revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes (1685). Many Protestant families left France for Geneva in the 1680s and later 
moved to other parts of Europe.25 Connections were often maintained with friends and 
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320. 
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25 Samuel Romilly, Memoires of the Life of Sir Samuel Romilly written by himself, 3 vols (London, 
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relations who remained in the city. Equally, by the 1730s Geneva had become a 
destination of choice during the Grand Tour.26 Thomas Gray, the poet, noted that ‘I do 
not wonder so many English choose it for their residence; the city is very small, neat, 
prettily built, and extremely populous’. Gray added that Geneva was ‘surrounded with 
new fortifications’, that ‘makes the little republic appear a match for a much greater 
power; though perhaps Geneva, and all that belongs to it, are not of equal extent with 
Windsor and its two parks’.27 The new fortifications were to prove useless in the face 
of French arms. 
 
Some British visitors stayed. Sometimes the reason was health. The most 
significant case of close Anglo-Genevan relations was the Stanhope family. Philip, 2nd 
earl Stanhope, had brought his family to Geneva in the early 1760s and remained until 
1774. He initially travelled to have his son Philip’s tuberculosis cured by the eminent 
physician Théordore Tronchin. When this failed, his son having died in 1763, the 
family remained at Geneva for the good health of Charles Stanhope, the second son. 
Philip Stanhope was involved in the constitutional crisis at Geneva of 1766-1768. 
Once more the opponents of the magistrates were organising violent protests against 
taxes and laws that were deemed to be oppressive. One such law was the censoring 
and burning of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Contrat social and Émile in addition to his 
banishment from the republic. The enemies of the magistrates were now calling 
themselves représentants because they represented their grievances at the General 
Council (Conseil générale) of all citizens and bourgeois. The représentants believed 
that the magistrates of the Council of Twenty-Five were challenging the sovereignty 
of this body, and turning Geneva into an aristocratic state characterised by loose 
morals and luxury. In short, the magistrates were abandoning the Protestant heritage 
of the city and were turning Genevans into Frenchmen. Philip Stanhope was 
sympathetic to the rebel représentants and sought to involve his cousin William Pitt, 
then First Lord of the Treasury, in their cause. Through William Norton, the British 
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ambassador to the cantons at Bern, Stanhope advised turning Geneva into a canton in 
the belief that this would end both French influence and magisterial tyranny.28As the 
French ministers recognised, the British government was not interested in taking the 
initiative and was happy to allow French and Swiss mediators to end the internal 
dispute.29 
 
When antagonism between the représentants and the magistrates once more 
became violent, in the early 1780s, the British press was initially opposed to the 
rebels. News of a revolution in government at Geneva was reported from February 
1781 in a hostile fashion. The représentants were said to have taken control of the 
city on the evening of 5-6 February and to have shut the gates of the town to outsiders. 
Mediators from Bern were stated to be on their way, and would open the gates by 
force, if necessary. France was also held to be willing to take revenge upon any 
disturbers of civil peace.30 Intervention proved unnecessary as the violence was short-
lived. Events of 4-5 April 1782, however, were much more serious. Thirty-five 
inhabitants were reported dead during civil unrest initiated by the représentants, 
including a ‘venerable lady’ of 82 who was shot on her balcony. The ‘malcontents’ 
attacked the city guard, overwhelmed the governing councils and insulted the 
magistrates. Taking control of the city, they repaired the defences of the walled town 
and prepared to fight or die. One Genevan wrote that ‘the true patriots among the men, 
women and children are resolved to defend their liberty to the last drop of their 
blood’.31 The French ambassador (résident) Castelnau fled to Versailles to receive 
instruction on how to resolve the conflict. French troops under the Marquis de 
Jaucourt then joined the soldiers of the Bernese general Baron Lentulus, and those of 
Geneva’s historic enemy, Savoy, under the Count Marmora. Twelve thousand soldiers 
marched on the city, arriving at the end of June. For the British newspapers, such a 
                                                        
28 Philip Stanhope to William Pitt, 2 February 1767, PRO 30/70/3/136; Philip Stanhope to William Pitt, 
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vols (Oxford, 1963-1994), XXIX, pp. 229-235. See also William Henry Nassau de Zuylestein, 4th earl 
of Rochford to Shelburne, 22 January 1768 and 11 February 1768, PRO, SP 78/274. 
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response was entirely in keeping with the need to combat rebellion.32 Appeals were 
made by the représentants to their friends in Britain for government support for their 
cause on 10 June 1782. Willoughby Bertie, the 4th earl of Abingdon and an associate 
of the rebels, informed them that Britain was too weak to help, being ‘rent by 
divisions at home, and surrounded by enemies abroad’.33 In any case, the government 
was not inclined to become involved at Geneva and followed the standard line in 
refusing aid. 
 
The British papers reported that matters quickly came to a head. The Marquis 
de Jaucourt opened trenches around the walls on Saturday 29 June, raised his canons 
onto batteries, and prepared to give the order for thousands of troops from three 
nations to attack. After granting delays to the defenders, at 2 o’clock on the morning 
of Monday July 1 de Jaucourt received a letter from the magistrates stating that they 
were once more in control and that the city was open to the soldiers. The 
représentants had capitulated. The bridges that had been broken down to prevent 
entry were restored and troops entered Geneva. It was discovered that the 
représentants had put gunpowder in the houses of their enemies, and in the cathedral 
of Saint-Pierre.34 Enough gunpowder was discovered to have entirely destroyed the 
city as soon as the first mortar bomb caused a fire.  One London newspaper made the 
point that the surrender could not easily be understood as the defenders had prepared 
since April for a siege; at the same time, the surrender was supported as an act saving 
bloodshed and the destruction of property: ‘we know not yet what determined the 
Representatives to surrender without availing themselves of the means of defence 
which they had accumulated. It is likely that at last the voice of some moderate people 
of their party prevailed so far as to be heard’. Thirty représentants escaped by boat to 
the nearby village of Versoix. They were chased by an armed bark, and only reached 
the shore by swimming. Papers belonging to one of the leaders of the insurgency were 
found in the boat. The victors, having restored all of the old magistrates, took control 
                                                        
32 London Chronicle (London), April 25 1782 - April 27 1782; Issue 3964; Parker’s General 
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33 ‘British and Foreign History’, Andrew Kippis (ed.), The New annual register, or, General repository 
of history, politics, and littérature for the year 1782 (London, 1783), pp. 63-64. 
34 François d’Ivernois to Mountstuart, 26 June 1782, Bibliothèque de Genève, MS Suppl. 32, fol. 368. 
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of the city and left 1400 troops within its walls. Most of garrison was French.35 All of 
the founders of New Geneva were among the escapees. 
 
In the ‘pacification’ that followed, a new constitutional code was formulated 
for Geneva. The General Council of all citizens and bourgeois allowed the new 
constitution to pass into law only after all of the rebel représentants who remained in 
the city were denied the vote. A general amnesty was then granted, with the exception 
of the twenty-one leaders of the représentants and natifs deemed responsible for the 
rebellion. De Jaucourt stated that these men could not be pardoned because lenity 
‘would prove detrimental to the republic, and would exceed the limits of what every 
free state owes to itself, and the rights of all sovereigns’. It was therefore 
‘indispensably necessary’ that pastors such as Jacob Vernes and Isaac-Solomon 
Anspach, merchants such as Etienne Clavière, and lawyers including Jacques-Antoine 
Du Roveray, François d’Ivernois, be banished for life.36 
 
Further light was shed for British readers on the decision to open the city gates 
to the invaders. When a vote was first taken by the représentants on the evening of 30 
June only four were in favour of surrender out of 200. After argument, however, 108 
voted ‘not to surrender but to give way to force on condition of leaving the city’. The 
remaining 92 were unshaken. A ‘weak majority’ of 16 votes had saved the city. It was 
reported that in the aftermath more than 2000 passports had been issued to 
représentants who wanted to leave Geneva.37 None of the reports in the newspapers 
as positively disposed towards the représentants, who were variously described as 
violent rebels, dissidents and troublemakers. This attitude within the British press 
changed completely in October 1782. This reflected the altogether altered perspective 
of the government, which may well have orchestrated more positive views of the 
Genevan rebels. 
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A report in the Morning Herald and Daily Advertiser on Tuesday October 8, 1782 
announced that the Genevan représentants were being encouraged by the British 
government to settle in Ireland. They were to establish a colony and bring with them 
the skills that had made Genevan manufactures renowned: 
 
We are happy to inform the public that an order yesterday was made by the 
Privy-Council, to encourage a colony from Geneva to settle in this country. 
Some most respectable citizens of that oppressed republic have been 
soliciting an asylum in this rising land of liberty, for a number of their 
inhabitants give the preference to Ireland, and propose to bring with them the 
arts and manufactures that have long rendered that city the envy of Europe 
and the continued object of the jealousy of France.38 
 
A large sum of money was reported to have been offered ‘to a number of unfortunate 
but virtuous citizens of Geneva’ as an inducement. In addition, William Robert 
Fitzgerald, 2nd duke of Leinster, a leader of the Volunteers made Knight of the order 
of St Patrick in 1783, had offered ‘two thousand acres in excellent cultivation’ to the 
asylum seekers in addition to ‘convenient houses’. He intended ‘an absolute gift of 
the whole of this territory to the Genevan emigrants for ever, without referring to my 
self a quit-rent or any rights of seigniority’. The land was ‘two miles from Athy and 
Castle Dermot, and six miles from Carlow’. Leinster stated that his motivation was 
that of a ‘friend of virtue’, desirous of providing ‘an asylum in which they may 
experience that liberty, enjoyed by this in preference to any other nation in the 
universe’. Equally Lord Ely offered a settlement on his estate in the county of 
Wexford ‘where it shall be my constant study to make your people a more rich, free 
and happy colony, than ever the city of Geneva could boast’. Confessing that he was 
‘abundantly rich’, his motivation was to erect ‘a more durable monument to my 
memory than marble can boast, or the most skilful artist devise’. This would be 
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realised by acting as ‘the protector of a body of men whom I regard with the greatest 
reverence.’39 
 
Post-invasion Geneva was said to be in decline. The magistrates had already 
built a playhouse, which was ‘a sure means of corrupting the manners of the people’. 
Ever greater numbers of bourgeois and citizens were seeking to leave.40 In the 
following weeks further details emerged. The opportunity to create a new city was 
being offered to any who would leave Geneva. It was later reported that ten thousand 
inhabitants were willing to leave because of the ‘league that was entered into by 
France, Sardinia, and Bern, to destroy the independence of Geneva’.41 Other estimates 
went as high as 20,000.42 The newspapers were being made aware that a decision had 
been taken by the British government to ‘secure a favourable reception for such 
families as were determined to quit Geneva, and not only a favourable reception but 
such positive encouragement & support as might reimburse their expenses, & lay the 
foundation of an establishment in this country’.43 
 
Samuel Romilly, then a young lawyer and of Huguenot descent, informed his 
brother-in-law Jean Roget, a représentant living at Lausanne, that the government had 
offered £50,000 to the Genevans. The funds were to pay for the establishment of a 
colony of 1000 watchmakers who were ‘to have a charter of incorporation, by which 
they will be enabled to elect their own magistrates, and to regulate entirely their own 
internal police’. The location of the settlement had yet to be decided. Romilly 
confirmed that the Duke of Leinster had made a remarkably generous offer.44 Two 
issues had been determined. The city was to be called New Geneva. Furthermore, it 
was ‘to resemble the old Geneva in everything, except in having an upper and a lower 
town’. In other words, New Geneva was not to allow a caste of magistrates or 
                                                        
39 Duke of Leinster to François d’Ivernois, Lord Ely to François d’Ivernois in ‘Settlement of the 
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aristocrats to develop through living apart from ordinary people. Romilly likened the 
settlement to a second Troy. He added that there were also plans to move the Genevan 
Academy to Ireland.45 The reinstated magistrates at Geneva were furious about the 
actions of the British government, and complained both to George III and the Home 
Secretary Thomas Townshend.46 
 
The British and Irish responses to the proposal were on the surface altogether 
positive. At a meeting of the troops of the Union Light Dragoons at Dublin on 
Monday, 21 October 1782, it was resolved that ‘Irishmen, armed in defence of their 
civil and religious liberties, ought to be attached to any country or body of people 
who have stood forward in support of so glorious a cause [as that of the Genevans]’.47 
Certain exiles were reported to have accepted membership of the dragoons and to 
have sported the uniform.48 It was also said that ‘the nobility and gentry of Ireland 
seemed to vie with each other in countenancing the settlement’.49 One spur to British 
willingness to embrace the New Geneva project was evidence of alternative schemes. 
Carl Theodore, Elector of Bavaria, was reported in the British press to have offered 
the Genevan exiles money, land and housing, their own criminal code and other 
liberties if they settled in Mannheim in the Palatinate. Bavaria was linked to the 
Palatinate through the inheritance of the Sulzbach branch of the Wittelsbach dynasty 
after the Bavarian line failed in 1777. With Catholic Bavaria being linked to the 
predominantly Calvinist Palatinate, there was a need for religious toleration and 
economic development. Elector Carl Theodore was determined ‘to have the glory of 
opening a refuge to an enlightened, industrious and oppressed people’.50 The 
Genevans had other options. Invitations had been received from the Landgrave of 
Hess-Homburg, from the Countess of Neustadt at Dresden, from the Grand Duke of 
Tuscany (Leopold) and from his brother the Holy Roman Emperor Joseph II, who 
                                                        
45 Jean Roget to Samuel Romilly, 18 December 1782, in F. F. Roget, Lettres de Jean Roget 1780-1783 
(London, 1911), pp. 292-294. See further Jennifer Powell-McNutt and Richard Whatmore, ‘The 
Attempts to Transfer the Genevan Academy to Ireland and to America, 1782-1795’, The Historical 
Journal, 56/2 (2013), pp. 345-368. 
46 Syndics and Council of Geneva to Thomas Townshend, 18 Dec. 1782, PRO, FO 95/8/12; Syndics 
and Council of Geneva to George III, 18 Dec. 1782, PRO, FO 95/8/12 f. 637. 
47 The Remembrancer, or Impartial repository of public events, for the year 1782, Part II (London, 
1782), pp. 370-371. 
48 Karmin, Sir Francis d’Ivernois, p. 136. 
49 William Coxe, Travels in Switzerland, 2 vols (London, 1789), II, p. 385. 
50 Anon., ‘Extract of a letter from Mannheim, October 1’, Morning Chronicle and London 
Advertiser (London), Monday, October 21 1782; Issue 4189. 
 16 
wanted the exiles to settle in the imperial city of Konstanz or at Brussels.51 Charles 
Stanhope also offered the Genevans substantial lands in Derbyshire.52 
 
It was the persistence of François d’Ivernois that ensured that a deal was done 
with the British. François d’Ivernois had been born at Geneva on 9 April 1757 into a 
‘bourgeois’ family. His father François-Henri d’Ivernois, a merchant, became a 
prominent représentant in the 1760s, and liaised with Rousseau after the publication 
of the Lettres écrites de la montagne (1764). Rousseau was critical of François-Henri 
d’Ivernois in his Confessions but was considered a close friend by members of the 
d’Ivernois family. François was the fourth son, educated in law at the Collège de 
Genève, and became an advocate in 1781. From 1778 until 1784, however, he 
established and directed, with two associates, the publishing firm ‘Société 
typographique de Boin, d’Ivernois et Bassompierre’. Its goal was a complete edition 
of Rousseau’s writings, including manuscripts left in the possession of his widow and 
his friends. The ‘Geneva’ edition of Rousseau’s works was the result. At the same 
time d’Ivernois became a leading représentant. The représentants, from the early 
1770s, were led by his friends the lawyer Jacques-Antoine Du Roveray and the 
merchant Etienne Clavière. As a negotiator for his party, d’Ivernois had sought to 
enroll British diplomats into the représentant cause prior to the Genevan revolution of 
1782. One such was John Stuart (Mountstuart). In his diplomatic post at Turin 
Mountstuart had established regular contact with the représentants. One of them, the 
comte Isaac Pictet, asked Mountstuart if it might be possible to bring the North 
American war to Europe by using Swiss troops paid for by Britain to invade Alsace. 
The assumption was that if the Swiss and the British united against France, the 
independence of Geneva would be an unintended consequence.53 
 
A week after his flight from Geneva, on 7 July 1782, d’Ivernois had written to 
Mountstuart stating his desire ‘to transplant into England the Republic [of Geneva], or 
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at least the most advantageous part of the Republic’. By this he meant the 
watchmaking part of Geneva, which he estimated at ‘half of the city’.54 D’Ivernois 
travelled to London as soon as he could and stayed with his other English patron 
Charles Stanhope. He requested that Mountstuart address correspondence to him via 
Charles Stanhope at Harley Street. Stanhope and Mountstuart promoted the Genevan 
cause before the new ministry of Lord Shelburne; having been secretary of state for 
home, colonial and Irish affairs under Rockingham, after the latter’s death Shelburne 
served as First Lord of the Treasury from July 1782 to April 1783. D’Ivernois then 
submitted a memorandum to the British government on 27 September 1782. The fact 
that the newspapers were informing readers of the favourable response of the ministry 
only days later, underscores the high level of support that d’Ivernois’ initiative 
received.  
 
The nature of the support became clear when d’Ivernois dined with Shelburne 
and with George Nugent-Temple-Grenville, Earl Temple (created first marquess of 
Buckingham in 1784), who had become lord lieutenant of Ireland in July 1782.55 
D’Ivernois then returned to Neuchâtel to promote the emigration with eight 
commissioners representing the Genevans. Each commissioner was one of the 
individuals banished from Geneva by the French: d’Ivernois himself, Clavière, Du 
Roveray, Gasc, Melly, Grenus, Ringler and Baumier. D’Ivernois then returned to 
London with Du Roveray, and joined Clavière, Gasc, Grenus, Melly and Ringler at 
Dublin. Earl Temple received them at Dublin Castle on 14 February 1783.56 The 
representatives on the British side included George Beresford, 2nd earl of Tyrone 
(created marquess of Waterford in 1789), who had been prominent in Waterford 
politics since 1766, John Beresford, the Member of Parliament for Waterford, Sir  
John Blaquiere, Henry Theophilus Clements, John Foster, William Wyndham, James 
Cuffe, David La Touche, Andrew Caldwel, Travers Hartley and Alexander Jaffray.57 
 
The arrangement between the British and the Genevans was announced on 4 
April 1783. Earl Temple issued a warrant for the settlement of the Genevans in 
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accordance with ‘principles truly interesting to justice and humanity’. The will of 
George III had been confirmed to be ‘to induce the said merchants, artists, and 
manufacturers, citizens, or inhabitants of Geneva, to settle in Ireland, under the 
conviction, that by their civil and religious principles, their industry, and their loyalty, 
they would materially contribute to the advantage of this kingdom’. The warrant 
confirmed the issue of £50,000, ‘to enable the first thousand emigrants to effect their 
purpose, of which a sum, not exceeding one half, to be applied to defray the expense 
of their journey, and the carriage of their effects; and the remainder to be applied in 
the building or providing houses for their reception’. A charter was to be drawn up 
specifying the laws of the colony with regard to politics and commercial life, but the 
warrant stated that the Genevans would be able to regulate their internal concerns. 
They were to be naturalised, given land, and supported in establishing manufactures.  
 
Once the British had determined to promote their own New Geneva resources 
were forthcoming to facilitate the movement of the exiles. In October 1783 Lord 
North (Frederick North, second earl of Guilford from 1790) was said to have 
requested that the Admiralty send the brig Lion from the Downs to Ostend ‘to carry 
the said Genevese from thence to Waterford’. Charles-James Fox issued instructions 
that the Genevans should be granted ‘every assistance and protection they may 
want’.58 Between one hundred and two hundred and fifty exiles arrived from Geneva. 
Buildings were carefully planned and erected.59 The foundation stone of New Geneva 
was officially laid on 12 July 1784.60 Any connection to the anniversary of the victory 
at the battle of the Boyne is unknown. 
 
The Genevans were equally supportive of the project. One of the leaders of the 
représentants, Etienne Clavière, wrote that it was through the foundation of new cities 
that ‘we will give to men of all countries the courage to resist despotism’. Geneva had 
lost its liberty because of the unjust actions of the French and the cantons in invading 
a city controlled by its free populace. New Geneva would prevent such invasions 
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from being successful.61 Etienne Dumont, another représentant, but one who had 
remained at Geneva, was reported to have predicted that ‘the colony will rise, and will 
allow our people, who have been corrupted in our native soil, to re-establish their 
vigour on foreign soil’.62 One of the paid agents of the représentants, Honoré Gabriel 
Riqueti, comte de Mirabeau, warned the French Foreign minister Charles Gravier, 
comte de Vergennes in October 1782 that Britain, ‘the rich and calculating nation’, 
was pushing the Genevans towards Ireland, ‘the least cultivated and most savage 
[state] in Europe’. It was also ‘one of the most fertile and ideally situated for 
commerce’. As the British were offering full political rights, few laws, free trade and 
minimal taxes to the Genevans, Mirabeau anticipated the transformation of Ireland. 
Indeed, he stated that Ireland might become ‘the most free country on earth and the 
most desirable abode for men who know the value of liberty’.63 
 
Jacques-Pierre Brissot, a friend of the représentants and another of their 
propagandists, summarised the perspective of the exiles. In their last public 
declaration within Geneva the représentants had announced their collective decision 
to find a new abode, on the grounds that ‘their country had been reduced to slavery’. 
Geneva had ceased to be independent. It was under French dominion. According to 
Brissot, the représentants took as their model Aristomenes after the brutal Spartan 
defeat of the city of Messina. Seeing ‘the destruction of liberty they fled their country 
and went to found a new colony in Sicily, which has since become very eminent’. 
Geneva would wither within a century and ‘be likely to have been removed from the 
list of political states’. The Swiss, the Bavarians, and Frederick the Great through his 
territory at Neuchâtel, had offered land and resources to the exiles. But the preference 
had to be a ‘new country’. 
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Brissot described the ‘new country’ of Ireland as ‘perhaps the only asylum of 
liberty at present [in Europe], the only place where remarkable enterprises could 
fruitfully be taken forward’. Ireland was attracting exiles from other states because it 
offered civil and political liberty, easy naturalisation, the protection of a free 
parliament and few laws. Furthermore, it was rich in natural resources and ripe for 
commercial development.64 Finally, Ireland was fortunate, because ‘the terrible 
burden of [the British] national debt did not touch Ireland’. The plan of the Genevans 
was to ‘bring life to a savage place by their industry’. A charter had been signed with 
the British promising that they would govern themselves in accordance with their own 
laws and customs.65 The British newspapers also reported the view of the 
représentants that investment in the public debts of states across Europe had made too 
many Genevans far wealthier than their compatriots. Excessive inequality had 
corrupted Genevan politics.  It explained the internal civil war between magistrates 
seeking to turn themselves into aristocrats and their enemies. The remedy had to be 
that ‘the bell must be melted down and cast again’. This was what the Genevans were 





Why did D’Ivernois and his fellow leading représentants turn to Britain? The British 
government had, after all, refused to intervene at Geneva in the past. More 
particularly, all of the appeals to the British in 1782 had failed, to the chagrin of 
Mountstuart and Abbingdon. When Du Roveray had met with Charles James Fox in 
May 1782, when the latter was minister of foreign affairs in the Rockingham ministry, 
he was told that Britain could only offer pressure on Savoy not to interfere.67 In 
practice Savoy, with the full support of France, violated the traditional guarantee of 
Genevan politics, which was supposed to justify the intervention only of France, Bern 
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and Zurich. In doing so, for the représentants at least, the impotence of British 
diplomacy was underscored.  
 
Perceptions of Britain as a corrupt mercantile system had a direct impact upon 
the decision to find a haven in Ireland rather than in England. Months before the 
commencement of the New Geneva project Charles Stanhope had attempted in the 
House of Lords to reduce the quality of British gold used in manufacturing watches, 
from 22 to 18 carats, in the hope of allowing the British to compete with states like 
Geneva, where a higher proportion of alloy was added to the base metal. Stanhope’s 
failure led English goldsmiths to oppose a Genevan settlement that would be in direct 
competition with English trades.68 This was one of the reasons why Stanhope’s offer 
of land was rejected, and why Earl Temple and Shelburne accepted Ireland as the 
proper place for New Geneva.69 More particularly, Waterford, giving easy access to 
the Irish Sea and further to the Atlantic, was expected to encourage the export of 
watches abroad rather than importing them into England. The fact that the Genevans 
were pushed towards Ireland for mercantile reasons of state was pertinent because it 
reinforced an image of Britain as a state where the economic limits on politics were 
evident. D’Ivernois was candid in a letter to Mountstuart in which he stated that it was 
impossible to settle in England because of the debts of the state, the need to provide 
succour to refugees from North America rather than Geneva, and the problems about 
the gold standard. The contrast with an exhausted England embroiled in war was 
Ireland, which d’Ivernois called ‘a new country, newly free’ and ripe for commercial 
development. Mountstuart’s support was for d’Ivernois ‘the first cause of my 
success’.70 
 
Uncertainty about Britain’s prospects was why the représentants did not give 
up on France until the autumn of 1782. Evidence comes from Mirabeau’s letter to 
Vergennes of October 4, which threatened France with the consequences of the 
success of New Geneva, but also made a final appeal to the French to be 
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economically rational, and change their support from the magistrates to the 
représentants. The appeal fell on deaf ears. Another significant document was 
d’Ivernois’ history of the représentant cause, the Tableau historique et politique des 
révolutions de Genève dans le dix-huitième siècle. The book was published in 
November 1782 but had been circulated much earlier as a last-ditch defence of the 
représentants prior to their surrender. D’Ivernois did not comment on the events of 
1782, as his history was the first volume of a longer work, and only described the 
représentant movement up to the French-sponsored settlement of 1768. He did, 
however, attack England, which ought to have ‘declared that she would watch over 
that independence, and cover the liberty of this small state with her powerful 
protection’. D’Ivernois blamed the British failure to combat France for the invasion of 
1782; Britain could have ‘rescued Geneva from the interposition of France’.71 
 
D’Ivernois commenced the book with an appeal to Louis XVI, a friend to 
moderate wealth, ‘the golden mean earned by honest industry’ and ‘the simplicity of 
republican manners’. Louis XVI was ‘a monarch who since the beginning of his reign 
has been an object of veneration to true republicans’. The threat was that if France 
crushed Geneva the message would go out to other republics that ‘republican virtues 
must be displeasing to kings’. Furthermore, ‘if [Geneva] loses her liberty, industry 
will take its flight along with it’.72 The hope of the représentants prior to the invasion 
was that French policy in North America might be transplanted into Europe. If, at the 
same time, the foreign minister Vergennes was removed, a new policy towards 
Geneva might be forthcoming. Many of the représentants believed they had an ally at 
the French court in the form of the Genevan citizen Jacques Necker, who had served 
as the city’s ambassador to Paris prior to becoming head of the royal treasury from 22 
October 1776 and directeur général des finances from 29 June 1777. They had 
expectations that Necker might convince the young king to become the saviour of 
small states like Geneva.73 Necker’s fall from power on 19 May 1781 contributed to 
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the sense that French policy was unlikely to alter. This was confirmed when 
Vergennes’ sought to censor d’Ivernois’ book at Paris and to impede its circulation 
elsewhere. At Geneva d’Ivernois’ Tableau historique was condemned as a book 
dangerous to government. All copies were sequestered.74 As Jacques-Mallet Du Pan, 
a natif of Geneva and journalist critical of the représentants, put it: ‘do you believe 
you can convert kings [to your views] with your democratic declamations?’75 
 
D’Ivernois’ Tableau historique provided a summary of the représentant 
perspective on contemporary political and economic life. Many of the themes of the 
work were redolent of earlier writings by leading représentants, and especially Du 
Roveray’s attacks on French imperial designs upon Geneva, his assertion that 
economic prosperity was directly tied to liberty, and that a state that was not 
independent would never flourish.76 The représentants believed that small states 
across Europe were under threat because of the rise of aristocracy. Aristocracies arose 
through the people allowing politicians to cling to office: ‘offices for life are to 
commonwealths what Pandora’s box was to human nature’.77 D’Ivernois charted the 
transformation of magistrates into aristocrats at Geneva and the loss of popular liberty 
that resulted. Ultimately the rich, ‘to avoid being mingled’ with the people, moved to 
live on the hill.78Aristocrats, whether in republics or monarchies, had access to 
economic resources that enabled them to establish monopolies. They enjoyed political 
influence to ensure that such monopolies were maintained. They introduced luxury, 
the force that corrupted republican manners more than any other.79 Controls upon 
trade could only be maintained by force. The tragedy was that so many statesmen 
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across Europe were convinced that the greatness of their own state, and their 
continuance in office, was dependent upon the restrictive policies that fuelled 
aristocratic power. The kind of empire that France was seeking to establish across 
Europe, entailing economic dominion backed up by military threat, appeared to be the 
basis for national greatness. What the Genevan représentants believed they knew 
from direct experience, however, was that trade relied upon political liberty and good 
morals. Restrictive economic practices fostered excess wealth, which in turn created 
markets for luxury goods that ruined morals. Political oppression removed the vigour 
from national communities, and prevented inhabitants from giving their all to the 
economic wellbeing of the state. 
 
Proof lay in the history of Geneva in the eighteenth-century, which had been 
an economic powerhouse for three linked reasons: the republican manners of a 
populace devoted to virtue, good morals and the Calvinist religion. All of these had 
been challenged by the rise of an aristocratic faction whose wealth came from foreign 
investments, and who, with the support of France, had tightened their grip upon the 
democratic forum of the state, the General Council. Geneva was consequently in 
decline because of ‘a system calculated for subduing the citizens, and forcing them to 
silence by authority and fear’.80 This was important because the wealth of Europe, in 
the view of the représentants, depended upon the small communities that made up the 
continent, from imperial cities to independent republics to theocratic towns and minor 
principalities. The desire of the large states of Europe to create vast markets for their 
products, and to ensure that these markets consumed domestic goods, explained the 
crisis of small states like Geneva. More small states were falling before the rapacious 
commercial empires. These empires had to learn that industry could only ever be 
‘grafted onto the tree of liberty’, and would die in a regime dominated by ‘the 
intrigues of a few of our men in opulence’.81 
 
The impact of New Geneva upon représentant ideas about contemporary 
politics becomes clear by comparing the French edition of d’Ivernois’ Tableau 
historique of November 1782 with the English translation of May 1784, An Historical 
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and Political View of the Constitution and Revolutions of Geneva in the eighteenth 
century. The work was translated by John Farell, who dedicated it to David Latouche, 
one of the commissioners for New Geneva and of a Huguenot family, being ‘one of 
the most zealous and enlightened promoters of that establishment’.82 D’Ivernois 
added notes ‘for the satisfaction of foreigners’, including a description of Calvin as ‘a 
mortal foe to ecclesiastical hierarchy’ and a friend to the democratic foundation of the 
republic in the sovereignty of the General Council: ‘Calvin’s legislation was therefore 
a republican work.’83 Another added note attacked Bern, which had been appealed to 
constantly in the French edition. The Bernese relationship with Geneva had been 
characterized by ‘counterfeit friendship, perfidious succours and partial mediations 
terminated by an open oppression…and you still dare to honour yourselves with the 
title of Republicans, that title of which you have basely stripped your allies’.84 One of 
the most significant additions was a paragraph summarizing the représentants’ view 
of the consequences of the Genevan revolution for small states, and for republics 
more generally: 
 
Ye jealous Americans, and ye patriots of Ireland, survey the ruins of the 
constitution of Geneva, and interrogate her dispersed citizens; they all will 
inform you that the interference of foreigners in the internal divisions of an 
independent state is death to public liberty, and that the assistance of a 
despotic power must be ever attended with perfidy and danger. Believe the 
words of a citizen, (banished from a country that he idolized, by three foreign 
sovereigns, who, whilst they destroy her vitals, call themselves her 
benefactors. Believe the words of a citizen, who daily sheds the tears of 
bitterness over the iniquity of those who subverted the constitution of his 
country, and reproaches them, not so much for having deprived him of the 
right to inhabit there, as for having rendered it unworthy to be inhabited.85 
 
In short, the experience of the revolution of 1782 was that ‘Geneva has ceased to be a 
republic’. The ‘aristocratic faction’ would ‘plunge their fellow citizens still deeper 
into luxury and corruption’. For the Genevans left in the city d’Ivernois recommended 
                                                        
82 D’Ivernois, An Historical and Political View, p. iv. 
83 D’Ivernois, An Historical and Political View, p. 3n. 
84 D’Ivernois, An Historical and Political View, p. 48n. 
85 D’Ivernois, An Historical and Political View, p. 111. 
 26 
intoxication because ‘there are disorders for which no remedy is left but opium’.86 For 




That the French were mortal enemies to the représentants, and likely to remain so, 
was one reason for the appeal to Britain. There was a more profound reason, however, 
and it was that the représentants anticipated radical political and economic reform in 
Britain, and expected that they could help to foster exactly this. Reform was 
anticipated because Britain had experienced the full effects of the mercantile system, 
and had lost North America in consequence. It was because Britain was in decline that 
there was a greater chance of it becoming the defender of the small communities that 
had traditionally been the foundation of the European economy and system of states. 
Ireland was the ideal state from which to reform Britain, because legislative 
independence had recently been granted, and because of the growing support for free 
trade between Ireland and Britain.87 The free trade with Britain that the Genevans 
anticipated went contrary to the traditional mercantile controls over Irish goods, and 
would be a test case for a reformed regime.88 This view of Britain’s economic and 
political prospects was in accordance with the opinions of the Prime Minister 
Shelburne and of his friend Stanhope.89 Both men believed that the kind of successful 
republican community that they identified with Geneva, and more specifically with 
the représentant part of the city, in which manners were deemed pure and wealth 
moderate, and where religion sustained healthy democratic politics, had much to teach 
the British. Equally, Britain had no option but to embrace such reforms, in order to 
avoid the French doing elsewhere in Europe what had been done at Geneva in 1782. 
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Shelburne became prominent in national argument from July 1766, when he 
served under the elder Pitt, as secretary of state for the Southern Department (until 
October 1768). He favoured the removal of restrictions upon trade and colonial self-
governance.90 Shelburne was soon seen as a friend to small states. In 1767 James 
Hutton, the Moravian proselytiser, and Antoine-Jacques Roustan, a Genevan pastor, 
appealed for him to persuade the British government to take action against French 
influence at Geneva.91 Shelburne later complained to the French court about the 
annexation of Corsica. He was criticized for this, and made clear that he opposed 
Britain taking up arms for the defence of small states.92 Shelburne always claimed to 
have been inspired by Adam Smith in his political and economic ideas, who had 
revealed ‘the difference between light and darkness’.93 Shelburne gave copies of the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments to friends, persuaded Smith to tutor his younger brother 
at Edinburgh, and sought out his opinion on particular issues of the day.94 Smith 
convinced Shelburne that economic prosperity depended upon peace, and that peace 
depended upon the removal of restrictions upon trade. Shelburne believed that such 
principles equally motivated physiocratic authors such as Anne-Robert-Jacques 
Turgot and André Morellet, and was fascinated by Turgot’s idea of ‘establishing 
certain fixed fundamental principles of law, commerce, morality and politics 
comprehensive enough to embrace all religions and all countries’. Shelburne set his 
friend the dissenting minister Richard Price the task of developing general moral 
principles ‘as may embrace the Turk or the Gentoo equally with the Christian’.95  
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In government, and with parliament in recess, Shelburne devoted his time to 
ending the North American war. Having first become acquainted with Shelburne in 
England in the early 1770s, Morellet went to London in 1782 to negotiate on behalf of 
Vergennes. Morellet believed that the result, including a commitment to a commercial 
treaty between Britain and France, was a new international order. Enlightened self-
interest, rather than egoism, was the foundational principle.96 A provisional treaty of 
peace was signed between Britain and the United States at Paris on 13 November 
1782.  On 20 January 1783 preliminary articles were signed with France and with 
Spain.  Shelburne was convinced that he was helping Europe’s states to return to a 
natural growth path by establishing relations that would ultimately replace the 
mercantile system with free trade.97 In the House of Lords he identified ‘the era of 
Protestantism in trade’, the argument being that the new principle of commercial 
liberty was better suited to Protestant states, and that the progress of trade would 
partner the progress of religion. Free commerce with North America was the best 
future for Britain because ‘All Europe appear enlightened, and eager to throw off the 
vile shackles of oppressive ignorant monopoly, of that unmanly and illiberal principle, 
which is at once ungenerous and deceitful.’98 
 
After Shelburne resigned, on being defeated in the House of Commons on a 
motion censuring him for giving in to North American demands during the 
negotiations for peace, his secretary Benjamin Vaughan revealed that Shelburne had 
considered making England a free port.99 Shelburne later argued that ‘the general 
system of the late peace’ had extinguished ‘all mistaken ideas of rivalship’. Looking 
back some years later, he claimed that ‘never was there a period when animosity so 
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soon subsided, when so few subjects of discussion, much less of dispute, had occurred 
with France as subsequent to 1782’.100 
 
Shelburne’s support for New Geneva was partly motivated by a desire to show 
that Britain would take advantage of a French blunder while he was negotiating the 
peace from a position of weakness. It was, however, to a far greater extent motivated 
by a desire to challenge traditional Anglo-Irish relations, and to establish a free 
commercial relationship between the countries that would facilitate the further erosion 
of the mercantile system. New Geneva promised to be an example of economic power 
showing the mistaken consequences of invading smaller neighbours and taking away 
the liberties of industrious citizens. Free trade in Ireland was not expected to 
undermine competitor mainland industries, and positive consequences of economic 
development, led by Calvinists, were anticipated for Ireland’s Catholic peasantry. In 
short, New Geneva was the Irish branch of a policy that under Shelburne’s brief 
tenure as Prime Minister encompassed free trade with France and with the United 
States.101 Shelburne was said to be promoting similar projects on his own estates. In 
Kerry he sought to build a new town, called Kenmare after his friend Lord Kenmare, 
‘to establish trade, fix manufactures, open a harbour, build docks and ships, and 




The central reason why the représentants came to Britain was because of Stanhope’s 
strong connection with them and his view of the prospects for reform in 1782. 
Stanhope had become a représentant as early as 1771, when he was given bourgeois 
status, elected to the Council of Two Hundred, and made commander of the Tir de 
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l’Arc or company of archers.103 As head of the archers Stanhope contributed to the 
military readiness of the city. He was interested in siege-warfare, in incendiary 
devices, and in inventions to defend walled towns.104 In true représentant fashion he 
was concerned about the decline of morals within the city, arguing that ‘the simplicity 
of ancient manners is absolutely necessary for the preservation of the republican 
spirit’.105 He opposed Genevans visiting the theatre, and established a Society of Arts 
to improve political debate and foster commercial innovation.106 Seeing Geneva as a 
popular government in which the citizens and bourgeois were sovereign, he always 
defended the General Council. Before 1782 Stanhope had contributed to the 
development of the political thought of the représentants; he always referred to 
Geneva as ‘his second country’. During the 1770s he proposed an alternative voting 
system for elections at Geneva that was intended to prevent aristocratic dominion at 
the same time as it facilitated efficient political decision-making.107 
 
Stanhope was particularly close to Du Roveray and it was to him that he 
offered copies of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-1769) in 
order to facilitate the construction of a new law code at Geneva. Stanhope condemned 
the magistrates’ refusal to agree to a new code, and attacked the growth of aristocracy 
caused by inequality of wealth. The latter would ruin Geneva just as it had ruined 
Rome. Religion and manners were tied together, and if religion became corrupted by 
luxury or aristocratic manners, the result would be the speedy loss of liberty.108 
Stanhope recommended a return to the fundamental principles of the state, a 
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refounding that was possible in small states but more difficult, though equally 
necessary, in large empires like Britain.109 After his return to England in 1774 
Stanhope was in many respects seeking in Britain exactly the constitutional 
refounding that he had been promoting at Geneva. Although he failed to be elected to 
the Westminster constituency on a Wilkesite platform in 1774, he made links with 
reformers around Earl Chatham and Shelburne, becoming a friend of Christopher 
Wyvill.  His connections with the Pitt family were strengthened when he married 
Hester Pitt in the same year.  
 
Among Stanhope’s first speeches in the Commons, after he was elected 
member for Chipping Wycombe in 1780, was a condemnation of the government, 
‘whose baleful measures had loaded their country with disgrace and distress’. This 
was followed by numerous speeches for peace with North America, and proposals for 
greater parliamentary control over the army and the civil list.110 In the following year 
he defended Wilkes’ status as a member of parliament and introduced a bill for the 
reduction of bribery and expenses during elections.111 Stanhope supported a militia in 
Scotland and the right of the people to petition the crown, in the manner of the 
représentants at Geneva, became a member of the Society for Constitutional 
Information, and an advocate of parliamentary reform and religious toleration.112 One 
of Stanhope’s critics noted, ‘what a pity it is that the wards of Bedlam are 
unrepresented’.113 For Stanhope, New Geneva presented a rare opportunity to observe 
the effects of transplanting a republican community into a dependent state within a 
failing empire. When Shelburne’s government fell in February 1783, Stanhope 
expected the new government of his brother-in-law, William Pitt, to continue to 
support New Geneva. In March 1784 he had a letter published stating that he was 
confident that the new ministry would do exactly this. No more ‘doubts of success’ 
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should inhibit potential immigrants. Stanhope concluded, ‘I shall neglect no means of 




New Geneva failed despite the initial support it received in England and in Ireland. 
Thomas Orde, who became chief secretary for Ireland, was writing as late as May 
1784 that ‘if government had gone further [to favour the emigrants] it would have 
hazarded that very happiness in search of which you have offered yourselves to the 
friendly protection of a liberal nation’.115 The reasons for the collapse of New Geneva 
were various, and to do with the larger story of the detailed plans for the settlement, 
and the shifting political alliances in London and in Dublin. The major reason for the 
failure was the end of Shelburne’s political career. Another significant factor was the 
engagement of the Genevans with an Ireland in upheaval. These issues merit further 
scrutiny. The point being made here is that New Geneva was a rare example of a 
utopian project brought close to speedy fruition for reasons of economic development 
and international relations. More particularly, New Geneva was intended to show 
nations like France that the policy of eating up the small states of Europe was self-
defeating, and would only result in benefitting rivals like Britain. The French 
perspective, shared by many of the magistrates at Geneva, was that Britain was the 
greater threat to Europe’s small states, because of its growing dominion in trade.116 
 
For the Genevans involved in New Geneva the experience was initially 
dispiriting. Both Du Roveray and d’Ivernois felt let down by the British ministers, and 
repeated attempts to gain compensation initially fell on deaf ears. Shelburne was 
especially lax in responding to their requests, and they felt especially bitter because of 
the success of a related Genevan exile community at Constance. Each considered 
finding means of returning to Geneva despite being exiled for life; d’Ivernois came 
close to permanent emigration to Canada.117 Du Roveray was rewarded for his work 
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at New Geneva with a pension of £300 per year in 1785.118 D’Ivernois had to wait 
until 1789 for a similar honorarium. While d’Ivernois moved to London and became 
tutor to the children of the banker Samson Gideon, until a further revolution brought 
him back to Geneva in 1789, Du Roveray remained in Ireland. As a ‘naturalised 
Irishman and a friend of liberty’, Du Roveray continued to send plans for the 
improvement of the realm to Stanhope. These included a scheme for introducing 
public grain stores into Ireland, on the model of those at Geneva, in order to prevent 
famine.119 In the 1790s d’Ivernois became an indefatigable opponent of the French 
Revolution, and an advocate of unrelenting war by Britain upon the First French 
Republic.  Du Roveray became a spy for the British, working across Switzerland from 
1792.120 Arguing against both Shelburne and Stanhope, who remained cosmopolitan 
friends of peace and free trade, d’Ivernois and Du Roveray advocated a Britain with 
armies on mainland Europe, ready to defend Europe’s small states against attempts by 
France or other states at universal monarchy.121 New Geneva was turned into a 
barracks. It became notorious in 1798 because so many United Irishmen were 
executed within its walls. The Geneva barracks was referred to in the famous ballad 
‘The Croppy Boy’. The history of the Genevan exodus underscored the perilous state 
of Europe’s republics before 1789, the extent of the sense that Britain and Ireland 
were in crisis, and in need of radical medicine to address their problems, and that 
extreme and cosmopolitan reform projects were in the air. All of this in due course 
helped shape the course of the French Revolution and the upheavals that followed 
thereafter. 
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